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Introduction
Andrew Thompson's review of the long-running debate on informal
empire will be welcomed both by specialists, who need to be reminded
from time to time that many trees do sometimes make a forest, and by
teachers, who need help in guiding their students through both.1 The
comments that follow are therefore offered in a constructive spirit that is
wholly in accord with Thompson's purpose in trying to take hold of a
notoriously slippery concept. My aim in citing his work is to identify the
batch of established arguments that his essay faithfully represents. The
intention is to move the debate forward: the temptation to readvertise
familiar positions will be avoided as far as is possible; the risk of drowning
the argument in an excess of detail is removed by limitations of space.
Thompson's survey, as specialists will readily recognise, is essentially a
restatement and confirmation of the series of objections made by Platt and
others against both Gallagher and Robinson and advocates of the
dependency thesis.2 Thompson advances his case by looking at three
measures of informal imperialism: the degree of indirect power exercised
by Britain; the distribution of gains between Britain and Argentina; and
the role of collaborating elites. His general conclusion is that the record
does not support the view that Britain succeeded in establishing an
informal empire in Argentina. Before the 1870s, Britain's influence was
1
 'Informal Empire? An Exploration in the History of Anglo-Argentine Relations,
1810-1914', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 24 (1992), pp. 419-36.
2
 References to Platt and to the debate in general can be found in two valuable
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Nineteenth-Century Imperialism, special issue of the South African Journal of Economic
History, vol. 7 (1992).
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very limited and fell far short of'indirect political hegemony'.3 Even after
that date, and despite the massive expansion of her interests in the
republic, Britain still did not succeed in exercising control over
Argentina's economic affairs, with the result that, down to 1914,
Argentina's 'autonomy had not been prejudiced'.4 This outcome,
Thompson argues, flowed from the fact that Britain did not enjoy a
monopoly of trade and finance, that her influence on policy was limited,
that export-expansion was not imposed but negotiated in ways that gave
scope for local choice and initiative, and that international trade was
mutually advantageous.
I shall begin by summarising Thompson's argument and identifying
some of the difficulties raised by his three measures of informal
imperialism. I shall then outline an alternative way of analysing the
problem.
A. survey surveyed
The question of'indirect political hegemony'5 and its associate, 'control
of Argentine economic affairs',6 has both chronological and analytical
dimensions. Thompson argues that informal control of any kind was very
limited before 1870. Although there may be some room for argument
about the precise date, there is currently little scope for disagreeing on the
matter of substance. Platt showed that Gallagher and Robinson
overemphasised the extent of British influence during this period; while
his evidence stands so must his conclusion. Indeed, to labour this
judgement is to push on an open door: the definitive statement on the
subject was made by Charles Jones in an article published in this journal
more than a decade ago.7
In the second half of the century, and certainly after 1870, the problem
becomes much more complicated. All parties to the debate, including
Thompson, accept that British interests, especially economic interests,
expanded greatly during this period. The question is whether the process
is to be viewed as being an extension of normal business activity, or
whether it also delivered a degree of control that reflected inequalities in
the power of the trading partners. Thompson's handling of the economic
issues is insufficiently detailed (doubtless for reasons of space) to prove the
case he wishes to make. His observation that 'Argentina's reliance upon
one creditor engendered some instability but the effects of this are better
3
 Thompson, 'Informal Empire?', p. 425.
4
 Ibid., p. 430. 5 Ibid., p. 425. 6 Ibid., p. 426.
7
 Charles Jones, '"Business Imperialism" and Argentina, 1875-1900: A Theoretical
Note'', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 12 (1980), p. 437. Curiously, Thompson
makes no reference to this article.
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seen as a series of unconsummated examples of British influence rather
than a general pattern of control '8 assumes that the exceptions he cites
refute the hypothesis. However, the importance of the exceptions cannot
be assessed until the hypothesis itself has been clearly specified. As I shall
suggest later on, this requires some understanding of the aims of the
dominant power in seeking to create (or control) subordinate states.
Thompson's criticism of Ford's standard account of Anglo-Argentine
economic relations9 refers to two of the implications of Ford's analysis
but does not address his main concern, which was to show how Argentina
became integrated into the international economy under the gold standard
and to reveal the mechanisms that enabled the system to function.
Similarly, while Thompson (following Marichal and Kuznets) concedes
that 'Britain exerted some leverage over the Argentine economy, which
became responsive to domestic developments within the U.K. ',10 he goes
on to suggest that neither author offers' watertight models for the pattern
of overseas investment in Argentina'.11 It is not clear exactly what
Thompson's reference to 'watertight models' means: Marichal's as-
sessment draws together research by previous writers to support
judgements that are unexceptional rather than controversial; Kuznets's
study was global in scope and was never intended to contribute to this
particular debate. Thompson's main criticism appears to be less with the
analysis deployed by Ford and Marichal to explain the flow of finance and
goods in the international economy than with their failure, as he sees it,
to give sufficient weight to conditions and initiatives in Argentina. This
objection, however, is tangential rather than central: as we shall see later,
the fact of dependence needs to be separated both from its consequences
and from the various local inputs that helped to create or modify it.
Thompson also presents his own reasons for showing why the
expansion of British interests was not accompanied by an extension of
informal control. The first reason is based on the proposition that the
problem is 'best illustrated by delineating the limits to Britain's economic
influence in the region'.12 This assumption is open to question: in
searching for the limits without either identifying the criteria for defining
the existence of an informal empire or establishing what Britain's aims in
Argentina were, Thompson's list of exceptions may contain examples that
are unimportant to the conclusion he wishes to establish. The problem of
definition is most appropriately considered in the next section of this
essay; Britain's aims will be noted at this point to show how they can be
used as a check on Thompson's argument.
8
 Thompson, 'Informal Empire?' , p. 426.
9
 Ibid., p. 427- 10 Ibid., p. 428. l l Ibid., p. 428.
12
 Ibid., p. 426.
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If, for example, it is argued that Britain's overriding purpose was to
create the conditions needed to promote overseas investment and to
maintain debt service, then her success or failure can best be judged by
looking at the deals struck in areas most closely related to this aim.
Thompson's procedure does not encourage us to do this. Instead, he
identifies constraints that may have been irrelevant or insignificant in this
context. His first illustration,13 citing competition from foreign banks, if
pursued further, would show that neither France nor Germany could offer
Britain serious competition in financing Argentina before 1914, and
would therefore confirm the dominance of the City of London.14 The
second illustration,15 the invasion of the meat-packing industry by the
USA in 1907, simply demonstrates what is generally agreed, namely that
Britain favoured free trade and non-intervention in South America, and
gives some of the reasons why. In addition, we might add that because
Argentina was able to develop new markets overseas her export earnings
could be boosted and hence too the revenues that serviced foreign loans.
Thus, the diminution of Britain's influence in one area (meat packing) may
have helped to maintain British interests in another (finance). To
appreciate this possibility, however, it is necessary to take a view of
Britain's global position and to have a clear perspective on her priorities
in Argentina.
Thompson's second reason for denying that expanding interests were
accompanied by expanding control is that key events in the history of
Anglo-Argentine relations can be understood fully only be taking account
of the periphery as well as of the metropolis,16 a point also heavily
emphasised by Ferns.17 Thus, we are told that 'significantly, Marichal
concedes that the debt crisis of 1890 was unleashed by the crash in the
Argentine economy itself',18 that, while the 'British and Argentine
economies had become enmeshed', the 'resolution of the 1890 crisis is an
excellent example of how this fact had repercussions for both nations ',19
and that Britain had to ' show some largess' in the debt settlement ' if she
was to recover her investment and preserve a growing market for her
imports'.20
These observations are not as damaging as Thompson supposes. They
are significant only if a restrictive (and unrealistic) definition of informal
empire is adopted, one that assumes that all causation was located in the
13
 Ibid., p. 426.
14
 See, for example, H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford,
i960), pp. 69, 108—9; Roger Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, ryoo—ipjo (Boulder,
Col., 198;), pp. 24-7; C. Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From
Independence to the Great Depression, 1820-19)0 (Princeton, N.J., 1989), p. 161.
15
 Thompson, 'Informal Empire?', p. 427. I6 Ibid., pp. 428-9.
17
 H. S. Ferns, 'The Baring Crisis Revisited', journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 24
(1992), pp. 241—73. 18 Thompson, 'Informal Empire?', p. 428.
19
 Ibid., p. 429. 20 Ibid, p. 429.
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metropolis, that events on the periphery had no effect on the centre, and
that informal influence was the result of a series of directives that were
uncontaminated by negotiation or concession. This was not Gallagher and
Robinson's position in their 1953 article: indeed, as is well known,
Robinson subsequently developed an 'excentric' theory of empire-
building that emphasised the role of the periphery without in any way
retreating from the concept of informal empire.21 However, there is a
more important point to make here, namely that Thompson's argument
rests on assumptions that, as I shall try to show later, fail to distinguish
between levels of power and degrees of power. That Argentina played the
best hand she could does nothing to weaken the fact that Britain dealt the
cards; that some of the repercussions of international economic crises
were felt in Britain as well as in Argentina shows only that there was
mutual involvement, not that there was equal involvement; that Britain
had to negotiate and conciliate on a range of items, just as she had to in
much of the formal empire, should not be a cause of surprise once it is
remembered that it was Britain, not her satellites, who set the agenda in
the first place.
Thompson's next measure of informal empire relates to the distribution
of the gains arising from trade and investment. Here, Thompson's case is
that Argentina benefited from overseas trade and inflows of foreign
capital, that the relationship between Britain and Argentina was ' mutually
advantageous ',22 and that export expansion of the kind experienced by
Argentina, under British sponsorship, was the most promising route to
economic development.23 There are two comments to be made on these
propositions. The first concerns the technicalities of measuring gains from
international trade. Thompson does not explore this topic and it is too
complex to be entered into in the space available here, though of course
it should have a place in any full account of the consequences of
'dependent development'. The second comment, which is far more
important in the present context, concerns the relevance of this discussion
to the idea of informal empire.
Thompson has merged two arguments: one deals with the presence or
absence of informal empire; the other refers to the merits and defects of
the dependency thesis. He begins his article with a clear statement of
Gallagher and Robinson's thesis ;24 mid-way through he refutes the idea
of informal empire by alluding to arguments put forward by the
dependentistas;25 and by the close he refers to 'Robinson and Gallagher and
21
 Ronald Robinson, ' Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for
a Theory of Collaboration', in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory
of Imperialism (London, 1972), pp. 117-40.
22
 Thompson, 'Informal Empire?', p. 435. 23 Ibid., pp. 429-30.
24
 Ibid., pp. 419-20. 25 Ibid., pp. 427, 429.
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the dependency school' as if they can be harnessed together.26 Thompson
is not alone in running these arguments in tandem, and it is easy to see
why: the themes of foreign influence and dependence have a common
starting point in the history of European (capitalist) expansion, and they
have now merged in the historiography of Latin America to such an
extent that it is very difficult to tell them apart.
Nevertheless, at the risk of disturbing some familiar patterns of
thought, it is necessary to insist that, though the subjects of imperialism
and dependency overlap, they are not identical. Using arguments
appropriate to one to refute the other is an invalid procedure that is in no
way legitimated by the frequency of its appearance. Gallagher and
Robinson were concerned, above all, to establish a new way of looking at
the concept of imperialism. To this end, they laid considerable stress on
the role of expansionist forces stemming from Britain. But their essay was
not concerned with the long-term effects of imperialist expansion on the
development of the periphery, and they made no mention of the
dependency thesis, even in its pre-Frankean manifestations. The de-
pendency thesis, on the other hand, was concerned almost exclusively
with the consequences of capitalist (which became virtually a synonym for
imperialist) expansion.27 It took the world system as given, and
accordingly was content with a highly generalised version of its origins
and various forms.
Thus, when Thompson attacks the 'primary weakness in the argument
of the dependentistas',2* namely that Argentina should have followed a path
of development other than that routed through primary exports, he
undoubtedly identifies an important line of argument, which he then
pursues effectively in citing the work of Lewis and others on the
relationship between railways and economic development.29 But none of
this has any bearing on Gallagher and Robinson's thesis, either as stated
by them, or as an inference of what their argument might have committed
them to had they extended it to the developmental consequences of
imperialist expansion. The logic of their position is that imperialist
powers seek to maximise, or at least to pursue, their own interests. It does
26
 Ibid., p . 4 3 5 .
27
 1 hope it will be clear that here and throughout I am referring to what 1 shall call the
simple dependency thesis, which also seems to be Thompson's principal frame of
reference. I am aware of the ' new dependency thesis' and other sophisticated versions,
which ought to be distinguished from the popular, Frankean statement. However, the
emphasis is justified in the present context because the simple version has penetrated
the corpus of historians to a degree unmatched by other, inevitably more complex,
offerings. For one of a number of helpful guides see Philip J. O'Brien, 'Dependency
Revisited', in Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis (eds.), La/in America, Economic
Imperialism and the State (1985), p p . 4 0 - 6 9 .
28
 Thompson, 'Informal Empire?', p. 429. 29 Ibid., pp. 430-4.
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not follow, as a matter of necessity, that this purpose is incompatible with
the interests of others on the periphery or that gains from imperialist
expansion accrue exclusively to the metropolis.30 To defeat Andre Gunder
Frank is not to bring down Gallagher and Robinson. The latter are indeed
open to criticism, but scarcely by attacking them on territory that they
were not concerned to occupy, still less to defend.
Thompson's third measure of informal control, the role of collaborating
elites, can be dealt with briefly, not least because it occupies only a small
place in his general argument. The question Thompson seeks to answer
in this connection is whether Argentina's landed elite were 'intermediaries
of Britain's "informal empire" or independent actors on the Argentine
political stage'.31 His treatment of this subject is neither sustained nor
systematic (no doubt for reasons of space), but the general tenor of his
argument is to show that the Argentine elite acted in their own interests.32
Once again, it is not clear that acceptance of this conclusion is in any way
damaging to the concept of informal empire. Thompson tells us, for
example, that Rosas cultivated international ties from motives of
enlightened self-interest: 'he was not duped or beguiled into doing so'.33
But this condition was never part of Gallagher and Robinson's thesis, and
the main purpose of the notion of collaboration (even though we may
have reservations about the term itself) was to show how like-minded
elites came into prominence by pursuing interests that complemented
those of the major power. It may be that Thompson is dealing here with
the leakage of ideas from dependency, nationalist, or Marxist-conspiracy
channels, or he may have tapped an even deeper source in theories, drawn
from political science, that require a degree of compulsion to be present
if the exercise of power is to be demonstrated. It has to be emphasised,
however, that these are accretions or extensions that were not present in
Gallagher and Robinson's original statement; nor are they necessary to
the restatement that I shall now outline.
A revision revised
Perhaps the most fundamental, and certainly the most difficult, problem
in the discussion of imperialism is the definition of the terms on which the
whole edifice of argument and refutation stands. This observation ought
to be so evident as to be redundant by now. Unfortunately, however,
historians are often less than explicit in revealing the assumptions that
30
 Gallagher and Robinson also allowed for the possibility of coercion as well as
collaboration. In such cases, however, 'housebreaking' would be followed (in
Gallagher and Robinson's view) by the creation of collaborators drawn from local
elites.
31
 Ibid., p. 422. 32 Ibid., pp. 424, 430. 33 Ibid., p. 424.
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underpin their erudite use of source material, and indeed sometimes give
the impression that assumptions are merely the ideological prejudices of
those whose views they happen to disagree with. Consequently, the debate
over imperialism has long been bedevilled by the obscurity of some of the
basic presuppositions, with the result that wires have been crossed and
inappropriate proofs offered for favoured arguments - in ways discussed
in the previous part of this essay.
Imperialism involves the diminution of sovereignty through the
exercise of power.34 Accordingly, an analysis of the phenomenon needs to
be based on an understanding of these terms. Sovereignty can be defined
as control over the key elements of statehood: the constitution, law,
foreign policy and defence, education (and information), and economic
development. The adequacy of this list is open to discussion (and there is
certainly scope for its refinement), and there is much room for debate over
various possible measures of diminishing control and hence of sovereignty
itself. Ideally, these themes require at least a book, and probably a lifetime
too. My purpose here is limited simply to identifying, in principle, the
main elements that need to be considered.
The question of power is equally vast and probably even more resistant
to agreed definition, which means that it is all the more important for
historians to be explicit about the particular usage they favour. Suppose,
for example, that they assume a meaning that is close to Dahl's oft-quoted
definition, which stresses the element of command: power is the ability to
get others to do what they would not otherwise do.35 On this assumption,
actors on the periphery who were not compelled or deceived into taking
decisions and actions would not, strictly speaking, be subject to the
exercise of power or, by extension, to imperialism. Thus, in Thompson's
example, Rosas was not duped, but acted in his own interests. However,
this definition of power is limited and limiting: it describes only one
possibility and excludes others, many of which, arguably, occur more
widely. We might reasonably add, for instance, that power has an enabling
dimension: the ability to persuade others to do what they could not do
unaided, or to move more quickly than they might otherwise do if left to
themselves. In this case, as I observed earlier, Rosas could act in his own
interests and still be strongly influenced by external forces, including those
34
 Among other things, of course. One obvious addition, worth noting at this point, is
that imperialism has an integrative function. Evidently, this is not true of all cases
where the exertion of external power by one state diminishes the sovereignty of
another.
35
 Init ially in R o b e r t A. D a h l , Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City ( N e w
Haven, Conn., 1961). For an urbane but also learned survey see Joseph S. Nye, 'The
Changing Nature of World Power', Political Science Quarterly^ vol. 105 (1990),
pp. 177-92.
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associated with imperialism. By extension, there is also a demonstrative
aspect to power: the ability to influence through example. This ability
attaches to a major power by virtue of the moral authority it exercises,
with the result that it can alter and sometimes transform the preferences
of those drawn into its orbit.36 These possibilities suggest that differences
in historical interpretation can often be traced to their conceptual
foundations, which need to be revealed before their strength can be
assessed.
The next question is how to make the concept of power operational.
Again, there are various possibilities, each with its advocates and critics.
The point to stress, once more, is that what is needed is a visible
framework of analysis; otherwise claims and counter-claims become lost
in a vast no-man's-land between assertion and evidence. One promising
approach, which I shall use here for purposes of illustration, is that set out
recently by Susan Strange.37
Strange suggests that we should think of two kinds of power in
international relations. The first is what she terms structural power, which
allows its possessor to determine, or at least exert a predominant influence
on, the range of choice open to actors in the international arena, and to
lay down the general rules of the game governing relations between
them.38 She identifies four main aspects of structural power: control over
credit, control over production, control over security, and control of
knowledge, beliefs and ideas - which correspond closely to the elements
of sovereignty listed earlier. None of these exerts primacy over the others
by virtue of an ex cathedra ruling; each can be the foundation of effective
power, sometimes by itself, more often in combination, and with varying
degrees of emphasis, with one or more of the others. Between them, they
establish the framework for relations between the parties concerned. The
second form of power, relational power, has received rather more
attention, both from political scientists and from historians. Typically, it
has been used to examine relations between interests within a given
authority structure (notably the nation state) or to consider the various
bargains made between states in pursuing their priorities in the
international arena. As we have seen in considering the approach favoured
by Dahl, care has to be taken here to define the exercise of power in ways
3 6
 Nye , ' T h e Changing Na tu re of Wor ld P o w e r ' , refers to this as ' co-opt ive p o w e r '
(p. 181).
37
 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London, 1988), Ch. 2. Thompson ('Informal
Empire?', p. 434, n. 38) also refers to this study but does not incorporate it into his
analysis.
38
 Specialists will have noted the difference between this use of the term structural and
that favoured by neo-realists.
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that do not exclude forms of behaviour that are generally agreed to fall
within the boundaries marked by the study of imperialism.
Evidently, structural and relational forms of power are closely linked:
one establishes the context and the rules of the game; the other deals with
contests between the players. At the same time, the importance of
distinguishing between the two levels of analysis ought to be equally
apparent. On the one hand, conceptions of structural power should not
become simply a means of inferring or, more formally, of verifying the
outcome of the key bargains made at the relational level. On the other
hand, an investigation of imperialism that is confined to relational power
can readily be programmed to conclude too much from too little. The first
temptation has attracted advocates of the simple dependency thesis, whose
assumptions about the international power structure passed directly into
their understanding of relations within that structure and then came out
as conclusions about the consequences of imperialism - all with a speed
and certainty that was at once breathtaking and flawed in its basic
assumptions, in its often cavalier use of evidence, and in its deployment
of a rudimentary verificatory methodology. The second temptation has
beguiled many liberal critics, who have drawn general conclusions about
the validity of the notion of informal empire from their assessment of the
deals struck between British and Argentine interests at the local level
without first relating the various outcomes to the structural features that
established the boundaries of the bargaining process. To repeat: it is of
limited value to show that there were checks to Britain's influence in
Argentina unless this conclusion is also related to an understanding of
Britain's aims in the republic.
I shall conclude by indicating, with necessary brevity, how these rather
abstract propositions can be illustrated by the history of Anglo-Argentine
relations. Of the four types of structural power identified by Strange, I
shall examine just one, credit, as this is generally agreed to have been
particularly important to Argentina from the second half of the nineteenth
century onwards. Foreign investment and credit played a key role in
financing nation-building (sovereignty being a requisite for sovereign
debt) and, as is well known, in developing an export economy, which was
fundamental to generating the revenues that filled out the power of the
state and the wealth that supported the political and personal fortunes of
the ruling elite. Britain's role in this process was to integrate parts of the
world that lacked adequate capital markets of their own with the City of
London, which was well able to supply their needs. The essence of the
contract was that the recipients should honour their debts and generally
maintain a regime that was stable and sufficiently congenial in its attitude
towards expatriate interests to reassure foreign investors and their
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associates. Such, in essence, was the framework of opportunity (and the
accompanying rules) presented to Argentina in the nineteenth century.
The package was devised and issued by Britain, not by the recipients.
It is necessary, at this point, to emphasise the obvious, not only because
it remains important, but also because historians who focus on the
relational aspects of power are inclined to take for granted or even to
minimise broader (structural) considerations of this kind. Indeed, the
tendency of analyses that focus on local bargaining is precisely to show
that deals were struck by parties negotiating in the free market place of
trade and investment, and in this way to suggest that there was a high
degree of equality between them.39 It is therefore essential to be quite
clear, even at the risk of repetition, that the context defining the options
was shaped by the major power, in this case Britain. To put it at its
simplest: the pattern of Argentina's development in the nineteenth
century is incomprehensible unless this fact is kept centrally in mind.
Furthermore, it is evident that the relationship was also an unequal one.
Liberal critics of the dependency thesis are often concerned to deny the
existence of inequality because they fear making a concession that would
carry them on a devil's ride through asymmetry to 'unequal exchange',
'distorted development', and on to the terminus — underdevelopment.
But it is possible to buy the ticket without taking the journey. Just as
inequalities in the relationship are, in principle, consistent with mutual
gains, so the results of dependence are not programmed identically for all
nations and all periods of time. The fact that the simple dependency thesis
insisted on these connections in no way compels us to follow suit; but in
rejecting the inevitability of some of the consequences, we can still accept
the premise that the relationship was unequal.
The imbalance is evident in the patterns of investment and trade that
accompanied the growth of the export economy. It has been estimated
that approximately half of Argentina's fixed assets (excluding land) were
owned by foreigners, principally the British, by 1914;40 Argentine
investors, on the other hand, held an infinitesimal share of British assets.
Similarly, Argentina conducted about 28 per cent of her foreign trade
(imports and exports) with Britain in 1913, whereas less than 5 per cent
of Britain's overseas trade was accounted for by Argentina.41 British
39
 Th i s is the focus a d o p t e d by D . C. M. Platt (ed.), Business Imperialism, 1840-1$jo: A n
Enquiry Based on British Experience in Latin America (Oxford, 1977).
40
 See Alan M. Taylor, 'External Dependence, Demographic Burdens and Argentine
Economic Decline After the Belle Epoque', Journal of Economic History, vol. 52 (1992),
pp. 907-36. Taylor underlines the importance of foreign capital to Argentina's
economic growth by showing that the republic's economic problems in the 1920s were
closely linked to the drying up of financial flows from abroad.
41
 D. M. C. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914 (London, 1972), p. i n .
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power was felt in Argentina in shaping the structures and policies that
supported the export sector and its sustaining financial flows; Argentina's
influence on the formation of Britain's governing elite and on the cast of
her international policy was minimal. During the financial crises of the
1890s there were fears in Buenos Aires that Britain might adopt formal
measures of intervention ;42 no one in London lost sleep worrying about
the prospect that Argentina might seek to discipline her creditors in the
City. The Anglo-Argentine connection was important to Britain; it was
vital to Argentina.
Within this structural framework, negotiations between the parties
allowed scope for adjusting the precise terms of particular bargains, and
hence for fine-tuning the division of gains (and losses). This will surprise
only those who suppose that relational power consists of getting people
to do things that they would not otherwise do. But, as I have already
pointed out, Britain's attitude towards Argentina was based on the
assumption that the most effective form of management was by self-
policing, not by command. Argentina was regarded, with the colonies of
white settlement, as being a European society overseas: once the republic
had been shown the light, it was expected to follow the way in creating
institutions that would give expression to individual initiatives while
anchoring them in approved property rights, and would set in train a
process of economic 'improvement' that would be consistent with
political stability. It was recognised, of course, that Argentina differed
from the white empire in a number of respects, among them its
republicanism, its Catholicism, and its predominantly southern European
immigrant population. Against this, there were reassuring signs of
conformity as far as Britain's essential interests were concerned, and these
were greatly assisted by the Anglo-centric, indeed Anglophile, connec-
tions of members of the elite, even if not all of them had been educated,
like Pellegrini, at Harrow.
Since Britain's main priority in Argentina centred on finance, the
crucial test, at the relational level, of her performance as the dominant
foreign power is her record in defending and advancing this interest. Here
the results are surely unambiguous: Britain lost nothing of real importance
and made considerable gains as the period advanced. Limitations of space
allow only one example, though an important one, to be cited: the Baring
crisis, and the developments that followed in its wake.
The Baring crisis put to the test the alliance forged between Buenos
Aires and the City of London from the 1860s, following the settlement of
the defaulted debt of 1824 and the resumption of new lending to complete
42
 This serves as a reminder that perceptions, and in this case misperceptions, are
important to understanding outcomes.
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the unification of the republic and to generate export growth.43 One of the
consequences of the export expansion that followed was the appearance of
what today would be called development debt, whereby Argentina
contracted fixed obligations that had to be met from variable export
proceeds. At the close of the 1880s a financial crisis, compounded by
managerial errors on both sides, threatened the funding of the external
debt. The crisis broke in 1890 and was eventually resolved in 1893, after
lengthy negotiations and considerable political uncertainty in Argentina,
by the Romero Agreement, which established the terms of the debt
settlement.
That the crisis had local manifestations, even some local causes, is not
surprising. Given the extent to which Argentina had become integrated
into the international economy, the surprise would be their absence rather
than their presence. It is equally apparent that local initiatives played an
important part, along with those of Lord Rothschild, in devising a
solution to the crisis.44 However, it should also be clear that acceptance
of these facts is perfectly consistent with the view that Argentina remained
financially dependent upon London. Indeed, the settlement demonstrated
the extent to which the prosperity and political authority of the Argentine
elite rested ultimately on the power of the City.45 After the fall of Juarez
Celman in 1890 successive administrations took every opportunity to
proclaim their determination to conform to banking orthodoxy, and they
matched their words with actions. Argentina resumed full interest
payments in 1897, one year ahead of schedule, returned to the gold
standard in 1899, and began borrowing again heavily thereafter. This
reaction was fully in accord with London's judgement, which was formed
in the knowledge that Argentina had no alternative sources of external
capital and was managed by an elite that, like those in the white empire,
could be trusted in the end to conform to the rules of the game. This was
not a deal between peers: the parties had joint interests, but not equal
power in pursuing them. The settlement of the Baring crisis acknowledged
this fact.
The wider consequence of the settlement was to enable British firms to
43
 T h e li terature on the Baring crisis is t oo weighty to be listed here. Most of the
impor tan t references can be found in P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopk ins , British Imperialism:
Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 ( L o n d o n 1993), Chs. 4 and 9, to which should n o w
be added Ferns , ' T h e Baring Cr is is ' , cited above , n. 17.
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 Ferns, 'The Baring Crisis'.
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 That this was perfectly clear to the Argentine elite themselves is demonstrated by
John E. Hodge, 'Carlos Pellegrini and the Financial Crisis of 1890', Hispanic American
Historical Review, vol. 50 (1970), pp. 499-523, Hodge, like Ferns, was concerned to
emphasise the part played by members of the local elite, but he drew a different
conclusion about their independence. Ferns, strangely, appears to have bypassed
Hodge's work - which may help to explain its unjustified obscurity.
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penetrate further into the Argentine economy, thus accelerating a process
that had started in the 1860s, when the large joint stock banks began a
financial advance that gave British companies a sizeable stake in railways
and public utilities, as well as in banking and insurance.46 The Baring
crisis brought down two of the largest Argentine banks, and left the
London and River Plate Bank in an unassailable position. As the economy
revived, the London and River Plate took the lion's share of renewed
business and returned impressive profits down to 1914. The crisis also put
an end to Argentina's attempt to build a nationally owned railway
network. The need to cut expenditure and generate income to meet the
conditions of the debt settlement forced the government to 'privatise'
parts of the railway system by selling state companies to foreign, mainly
British, firms.47 Tariff policy remained equally friendly to foreign business
interests, and was aimed chiefly at generating the trade and revenues
needed to service the external debt and fund the administration. By 1914,
to cite the authoritative judgement of Charles Jones, 'large sections of the
Argentine economy were controlled from London'.48
Conclusion
Gallagher and Robinson were not the first scholars to make use of the idea
of informal empire, but they struck at the right moment and in a highly
effective way, and they succeeded, deservedly, lodging the concept in the
literature. The idea itself has long been open to criticism: it was
analytically imprecise and it has proved to be empirically vulnerable to
specialist expertise. The analytical uncertainties have usually been glossed
over by historians, which is why some attention has been paid to them
here.49 The empirical criticism, on the other hand, is voluminous, but
much of it makes an imponderable contribution to balancing the final
account because its underlying concepts remain obscure.
46
 See, for example, the important essays by Charles Jones, 'Commercial Banks' and
'Insurance Companies', in Platt, Business Imperialism, chs. 1-2; idem, 'The State and
Business Practice in Argentina, 1862—1914', in Abel and Lewis, Latin America, ch. 10;
idem, ' Great Capitalists and the Direction of British Overseas Investment in the Late
Nineteenth Century: the Case of Argentina', Business History, vol. 22 (1980); Linda
Jones, Charles Jones and Robert Greenhill, 'Public Utility Companies', in Platt,
Business Imperialism, ch. 3. Also V. B. Reber, British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires,
1S10-1SS0 (Bos ton , Mass . , 1979), ch. 4, and D . Jos l in , A Century of Banking in Latin
America ( L o n d o n , 1963), ch. 4.
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 See Col in Lewis , British Railways in Argentina, ii;/-ipi^: A Case Study of Foreign
Investment ( L o n d o n , 1983), p p . 8 6 - 7 , 1 1 8 - 2 0 ; Mar icha l , A Century of Debt, p p . 168-9 .
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Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', in
Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jtirgen Osterhammel (eds.), Imperialism and After:
Continuities and Discontinuities (London, 1986), ch. 19.
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The argument advanced here suggests that the concept of informal
empire, like its companions, the 'semi-colonies' and the 'invisible
empire', is in principle a valuable means of categorising conditions of
domination and subordination whereby a major state acts as an integrative
force, exercising power in ways that infringe the sovereignty of smaller
countries. Whether the results of this process assist or frustrate the course
of economic development is an important, but also a separate, question
that should not be allowed to prejudge the prior issue of how far the
recipients had become dependent upon external forces.
Regarding Argentina, I have tried to show that it is possible to take
issue with the liberal critics of Gallagher and Robinson without at the
same time falling into the capacious embrace of the dependency thesis. But
this conclusion itself does not simply involve a reversion to the undiluted
version of the original proposition advanced in 1953. In my judgement,
there is a plausible case for referring to an informal imperialism of intent
that produced results in securing Britain's main financial interests in
Argentina. However, much of the discussion, following Gallagher and
Robinson, has tended to treat the terms imperialism and empire as if they
were interchangeable, thus effectively merging them. The result is an in-
built bias towards exaggeration — a case of what might be called scientific
hyperbole, excusable in establishing the notion of informality but difficult
to defend thereafter. In principle, the terms ought to be distinguished.
Imperialism suggests a process whereby elements of sovereignty were
being eroded; empire implies a stage of completeness comparable to the
status of colonies in the formal empire. Whether informal imperialism also
amounted to informal empire in Argentina is a question that can be
answered only after the analysis has been extended to cover aspects of
sovereignty, besides finance, listed earlier. This is an exercise that requires
a book rather than an article; even so, the manuscript cannot be written
until detailed research on topics such as foreign policy, defence, education
and information has been completed.50 Gallagher and Robinson also
argued that the high point of informal empire occurred during the mid-
Victorian era. Subsequently, as Britain fell into relative decline as a great
power, she lost ground to her rivals and was driven, for defensive reasons,
into making formal acquisitions in various parts of the world.51 The
80
 Gallagher and Robinson may well have the last word as they had the first. On the one
hand, colonial powers may not be able to exercise, in practice, the sovereignty that is
formally theirs. In other words, they may need to resort to techniques of informal
influence within the context of formal rule. On the other hand, it is possible for an
external power to dominate, informally, the most important aspects of the sovereignty
of an independent state without dominating them all and without seeking to do so.
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argument outlined here is clearly very different: Britain's effective
influence was expanding in Argentina at the very moment when it was
supposed to be in general decline, and Britain herself remained a dynamic
and successful imperialist power right down to 1914.
Informal imperialism was an expanding reality in Argentina in the late
nineteenth century. We may pause before accepting that the results
amounted to a comprehensive informal 'empire', but the degree of
subordination in the critical area of finance and credit should not be in
doubt. Contemporaries were well aware of this: after Argentina failed in
1892 to secure alternative sources of finance from the United States, the
US consul in Buenos Aires reported, ruefully, that the British were
involved in 'everything, except politics, as intimately as though it were a
British colony'.52 The consul's use of terms may have been instinctive
rather than scientific, but his judgement points us in the right direction.
John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of
Imperialism (London, 1961).
52
 Quoted in Joseph Smith, Illusions of Conflict: Anglo-American Diplomacy Towards Latin
America, i86;-i8<>6 (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1979), p. 190.
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